Working Paper Series: Philosophy and Knowledge: Reflexion on a flexible management method by Fascia, Michael
 Page | 1  
 
  
WORKING PAPER SERIES: PHILOSOPHY AND KNOWLEDGE: 
Reflexion on a flexible management method. 
 




In this discussion, we reflect on the value given to knowledge in a business 
context and deliberate a contrary philosophical perspective which does not 
conform to prevailing knowledge theory. We consider why, if knowledge is 
key for business success and competitive advantage, the transfer of 
knowledge within an organisation remains problematic. Whereby, if the 
creation of knowledge before transfer is recognised is a significant factor in 
determining a starting point for analogous scrutiny, then what makes this 
focal point so difficult to establish and measure?  
We therefore consider parallelism between agents who believe propositions 
and the formal system that derives proposition. In doing so, we synthesise 
from current literature and research, the epistemic principal of ‘knowledge’, 
which underpins the understanding of the many congruent knowledge 
transfer theories, in a business context. To do this we reflect on Lindström 
and the epistemic states of Spohn, wherein, we can draw on descriptions of 
conditional doxastic maps, as a natural extension of contemporary Kripke 
models. We conclude the epistemic principle of ‘knowledge’, which 
underpins the plausibility of comparisons between epistemically 
distinguishable knowledge transfer, must include perspectives and doyennes 













 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337115 





For this discussion, we adopt a Hintikka 
(1962; 1963; 1982) logical [modal] 
operator as a useful predicate at the onset. 
This allows early establishment of an agent 
who believes it is possible to reason and 
represent aspects of beliefs regarding 
reality, from the frame of reference of the 
agent. Therefore, propositions in this 
discussion involving belief, knowledge and 
probability, assume elemental obligations, 
whereby, they become the appropriate 
actions of the agent ( Tajfel, 1978; Pick & 
Lockman 1981; Kranjec, et al. 2012), and 
this allows us to maintain a business 
context within the core discussion (Marx, 
1967;1978;1988; Weber,1925/1978). 
Moreover, to allow definitive 
axiomatisation, we recognise the logic of 
epistemic actions as a core aspect of this 
discussion, whereby, the altruistic 
cooperation and open conflict arena within 
an agent’s frame of reference, form 
intermediate and multi-agent belief 
revisions (Kranjec, 2005).  
This now becomes a very useful and 
pragmatic stating point, since it allows us to 
recognise interpretations of familiarity as 
elements of knowledge in an agent’s 
interpretation of reality, particularly in the 
region of cooperative problem solving and 
decision making. This becomes a 
significant premise, since interpretation of 
this interaction could lead to a number of 
different or individual validity 
subscriptions or solicitations. Identification 
of this standpoint is also necessary so as not 
to coerce the discussion toward 
simplification of pluralistic leadership 
realms or modes of existence (Storsletten & 
jakobsen, 2015). Similarly, distract us 
towards contemporarily established Popper 
(1968) - Renyi (1955) axioms, discussed by 
Boutilier, (1995) and expanded upon by 
Arlo-Costa & Parikh (2005). Secondly, as a 
discussion intermediary, this can allow us 
to recognise the notion of a qualitative 
approach to a contemporary Kripke-model 
(Kripke 1959). This is important as a 
Kripke-style model proposes that specific 
quantitative mechanisms are the key 
elements by which multi-agent belief 
revision are based on.  
Overview 
 
We can now agree, or at least assume, 
plausible extensions and reciprocal 
elements of classical probability theory 
which now allow us to interpret belief 
revision(s) and correct probabilistic 
understanding(s) required by conditional 
beliefs (Segerberg, 1998; 1999). 
Consequently, simplification of context or 
category of meaning, possibilities and 
necessities becomes possible, wherein, 
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plausibility tasks or probabilistic events 
become graded measures (Bennet , 2003). 
Whereby, allow us to interpret variations of 
classical belief revision theory, but 
intercede a multi-agent version. To 
underpin this simplistic, but interpretive 
stance, our discussion escalates the role and 
significance of validity (Fascia, 2015), 
within known knowledge transfer arenas 
(Argote et al. 2000) as this allows a 
foundation of significance to dominate any 
propositional inference. Additionally, it is 
perhaps unsurprising why interpretive 
positioning from contemporary literature 
leads to the view from (Dinur, 2011), who 
stresses that knowledge is a subjective 
perspective of an individual’s experience, 
and therefore, associated problems from a 
business environment are linked to the 
context of the knowledge itself. Whereby, 
our discussion assumes an interpretive 
congruence as an explanatory position, and 
this central locus becomes key for 
knowledge interpretation as it provides a 
valid frame of reference. Importantly, at 
this stage, establishment of simplistic 
context or category of meaning allow us to 
inaugurate boundaries of possibilities and 
necessities which, would otherwise have 
remained an overly complex endeavour. To 
help us gain a simplistic focus regarding 
this complex phenomena, within this 
discussion, we suggest that that agent can 
establish a real time state of validity, that is, 
an internal locus or state of belief, whereby, 
all iterations of probability relating to the 
transfer dilemma remain as valid, only if 
they are logical along a constant frame of 
reality. Thus, in this assemble, set G can 
assume a classical consequence operation 
Cn, wherein, the operation of expansion is 
concurrent with, and only with, the agent’s 
reality frame of reference Kranjec, et al. 
2012). Thus, we can deduce that any new 
information within this reality frame 
becomes and expansion of set G, (current 
understanding of all available knowledge), 
but only from the agents frame of reference 
(reality). This view in itself becomes 
understandable if you also consider its 
interpretation of knowledge from the 
perspective of (Barnett at al., 2011). Their 
view indicates that an individual’s past 
experiences related to knowledge can 
contribute to the retaining of knowledge, 
and, that personal resources may contribute 
to the current state of understanding. 
Business Context 
To assist with this complex interaction, key 
elements of emphasis can be drawn from a 
POPC lens approach (Fascia, 2015), since 
this approach allows a multi view 
perspective to interweave between 
individual and group interpretations within 
a linear frame of reference (Fascia, 2016). 
This approach allows us to consider that 
form and location of the knowledge, the 
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indication of knowledge-sharing capability, 
the relationship between the source and the 
recipient and the broader environment in 
which the transfer occurs, are all 
contributive factors in assessing success 
(Fascia, 2015).  This view now gives the 
observer a similar frame of reference to the 
participating agents, whereby, any revision 
of a proposition within the reference 
framework allows interpretation from a 
predicate. Hence, satisfy the necessary 
axioms, both by contradiction and revision, 
and at the same time, consider facets of 
congruence and consistency within the 
agent’s interpretation Kranjec, et al. 2012).  
If the position previously discussed is the 
universal norm within generalist business 
management theory (White & Cicmil, 
2016) , then one could legitimately ask, if 
the existence of knowledge that in itself 
depends on the interpretation of a 
foundational normality is true. Wherein, 
does the relationship of belief under this 
premise result from epistemic 
incongruence by assuming it is either 
connected on unconnected to the 
propositional outcome. If this rational 
intuition were collective, then, all 
knowledge must derive from a consequence 
of foundational ethics, which themselves 
cannot be refuted by accepted moral norms.  
This situation is perplexing to say the least 
and suggests that knowledge of the real 
world, particularly in a business context, is 
fallible and multifariously theory laden and 
allows several options when revising theory 
with a similar proposition, whereby, a 
willingness to accept presuppositions 
which is independent of any evidence. 
Thus, relating this position to knowledge 
value in a business context (White & 
Cicmil, 2016), it is important to consider 
the different beliefs asymmetries (Jehn et 
al., 2015) to which practitioners, as human 
beings, hold in two very distinct ways. 
These are basic and non-basic. (Lambek & 
American Mathematical Society., 2009). 
Regardless of indifference, there exists 
agreement within many research streams 
that organisational knowledge, even in this 
dissected form, is a recognised source of 
competitive advantage (Argote and Ingram 
2000, p. 156; Storsletten & jakobsen, 2015) 
and it is this centralisation of assumption, 
which can be used to underpin significance 
in an organisational context.  
Positioning 
Thus, this formalised position allows us to 
highlight principles, evident in current 
theoretical or conditional interpretations 
(Spohn ,1988) in the context of or 
surrounding knowledge transfer 
mechanisms. In doing so, easily relate these 
to practical and recognisable business 
environments. For example, leadership, 
discussed in detail by Storsletten & 
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jakobsen (2015). From this standpoint, we 
can then relate interpretation within an 
aperture of current thinking, wherein, 
theories of reality and change allow the 
formation of informal axiomatic theories of 
belief (Godel, 1932; Bull & Krister 1984), 
and therefore, remain perpetual or dynamic 
within a knowledge transfer scenario in a 
business context. {There is not enough time 
or space in this short discussion to go into 
an in-depth conversation around 
constructive or non- constructive truths}. 
However, unquestionably, it is only by 
analysing the somewhat complex processes 
which combine and surround daily working 
practices, that useful identification of 
normative and appropriate interaction 
between practitioners, during knowledge 
transfer, can be identified as useful or have 
value for an organisation. Nevertheless, 
analogous scrutiny at this point reflects 
egoistic formations of reality from a 
knowledge transfer practitioners 
perception, and can be thought of as a form 
of cautious belief (Rotaru et al., 2014) of 
any experience other than that relative to 
the knowledge transfer scenario. That is, 
continues to remain analogous to the 
knowledge transfer practitioner’s 
experiential accounts of knowledge, but, 
would be unable to validate the putative 
distinctive value of knowledge at a single 
reference point.  
Therefore, we can now understand that 
examination of knowledge taxonomy and 
the types of knowledge related to business, 
reveal the complex intertwining with 
necessary communication scenarios needed 
to transfer any notion of knowledge from 
both an observer and a participating agent 
or agents frame of reference (Kranjec, 
2005). If we accept this posit as knowledge 
that is independent of all particular 
experiences, then it is also equally 
important to understand the significance of 
experiential reasoning behind this 
interpretive position of knowledge before it 
is transferred. Whereby, any argument to 
the contrary would become invalid to either 
party. 
Thus, in this reality, any revision of 
proposition would result from the 
relationship between the two axioms and 
could be interpreted as measurement. We 
can now argue that this is a natural event, 
since the practitioners view of knowledge is 
subjective and assumes any possibly 
relevant mental states are experiential 
(Kranjec, 2005). Therefore, we could 
assume examination of an overriding 
epistemic principle as a required baseline 
for success critique. It is easy to understand 
why this simplistic view could be appealing 
and complete a natural enough answer for 
knowledge definition. However, this 
baseline would not relate to both business 
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and personal savannas of existence, since 
knowledge from this perspective can only 
exist because someone knows it in his or 
her mind (Shukla, M., 2015). By definition, 
knowledge in this form is not an 
independent entity, which can be 
transferred, such as information 
surrounding any material object might be 
(Shukla, M., 2015). For example, a subject 
or phenomena within a normal sphere of 
reality cannot be transferred as knowledge, 





For this discussion therefore, it is clear that 
a central locus of foundational realism 
(Peters et al, 2010) is somewhat important, 
and perhaps critical for the identification or 
interpretation surrounding the use of 
knowledge within an organisation, and 
certainly important if predicated by the 
wish to achieve and measure competitive 
advantage (Argote et al. 2000).  Although 
generalisability of this positioning could, 
on the surface at least, appear rather 
simplistic, contemporary theory differs in 
many respects. Authors such as (Shukla, 
2015) and (Evangelista & Durst, 2015) for 
example, lament that a generally accepted 
working definition of knowledge for the 
organisational environment is yet to be 
established. In this regards, (Dinur, 2011) 
further advises that in addition to no agreed 
definition of knowledge within 
management literature, little in the way of 
commonality can be offered regarding 
consequent theoretical positioning. This is 
reiterated in recent work by (Rotaru, 
Churilov, & Flitman, 2014) and (Donate & 
Guadamillas, 2015), who suggest that 
problems with knowledge transfer in a 
business context remain prevalent, since in 
the main, knowledge is difficult to define, 
can be ambiguous, unspecific and a 
dynamic phenomenon.  It remains difficult 
therefore, without the use of a logical 
structure, to deduce which assemblies of 
knowledge understanding support or 
interrupt emerging propositions, and which 
are simply a by-product from the 
interaction of the various actors involved in 
the transfer process (Rotaru, Churilov, & 
Flitman, 2014).  
Considering the previous text, it is perhaps 
understandable why many key authors 
focus on ways to comprehend and 
ultimately enhance this knowledge 
understanding in a business context, as it 
would appear to be a key factor in 
understanding useful attributes (White & 
Cicmil, 2016). However, in doing so, this 
view would ultimately seek to examine 
various propositions using a single point of 
view, principally from occidental foci, 
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which in itself is derived from historical 
concepts of Objectivism (Green, 2012). 
Therefore, we may consider this myopic 
interpretive stance as something, which 
contributes to the incredulity surrounding 
knowledge and is part of a non-existing 
logical context when deriving a reality 
(Stalnaker, 1968; Spohn ,1988). 
Consequently, the interpretive praxis for a 
specific knowledge schema could be 
debated at length as it would appear that 
there is no single interpretation of 
something, which could be interpreted as 
normal knowledge, even within the realms 
of contemporary thinking around critical 
realism (Bull & Krister 1984; Rotaru et al., 
2014). Ultimately, when considering a 
useful element to knowledge within an 
organisation, it would seem logical to 
consider how a position of identifiable 
knowledge fits within an agent’s 
interpretive overview of formalised 
knowledge within general business 
management theory, and how they are 
interpreted as useful in that context. That is, 
we need to consider the reality of how and 
why an observer of a knowledge transfer 
scenario would consider sets of closely 
related realities with differing frames of 
reference Boutilier, (1995). This would 
result in a formal structure of the agent’s 
belief and the ordering of epistemic 
propositions (Arlo-Costa & Parikh ,2005).  
Measurable Impost   
If we are now able to consider this duality 
of proposition as a single entity, that is, to 
what extent can alignment be validated, in 
a way that supports corrective knowledge 
transfer axioms (Jiang, et al., 2015), then it 
becomes a very useful perspective indeed. 
This is because both positional inferences 
presuppose an assumption, in that, they 
both require interpretive associations from 
the actors to legitimise any validity 
regarding knowledge, and thus, 
inextricably link knowledge and 
knowledge transfer as the same cognitive 
process (Kranjec, 2005).  
That is, differing actions align to differing 
options or operators of necessity, and not 
simply interpretations of fallible and 
defeasible evidence as 
experiential/nonexperiential. This is an 
important position to adopt, as we can now 
approach epistemological issues regarding 
the definition of knowledge and knowledge 
value from a pragmatic centre. However, 
we first need to be able to adopt an 
axiomatic starting point (Jiang, et al., 2015) 
and epistemic principle from which to 
define knowledge from multiple 
perspectives. The benefit from this 
interpretation is clear, that is, if we endorse 
this axiomatic positioning, then we can 
endorse both hermeneutics and 
foundationalism as a generality norm or 
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singularity. That is, it becomes dynamic. 
Whereby, the represented states of external 
reality of the observer assume the agents 
position as not part of the observers reality 
frame. Whereby, the agent’s dispositions 
do not align to his beliefs. Thus, his actions 
or change, cannot effect any part of any 
external reality. 
In this case, we can now draw from 
definition by (Feenstra, 1988) and (Ahmad 
& Daghfous, 2010), whereby, knowledge 
must consist, at least to a large extent, in a 
clarification of value which does not consist 
in definition alone, and therefore, must 
possess a systemic for such clarification 
using epistemic principle. As such, we can 
now agree that knowledge from this 
multivariate perspective exists as a 
combined state, but our awareness of it 
remains unclear, is singular in focus and 
suffers from borrowed interpretations 
covering many disciplines. In this sense, we 
can now understand why, although 
numerous in number, most theoretical 
interpretations belie the potentials inherent 
in focused research. Wherein, most 
attempts to categorise a temporal state for 
knowledge end up as a lateral presumption 
which, by its very nature, attempts to 
coexist with cognitive interpretations of 
knowledge. Therefore, it is easy to see why 
interpretations inevitably vary, are very 
broad and where non-specific boundaries 
and parameters pillory most, if not all, 
indices of symptomatic validity.  To fully 
debate, this point would be extensive to say 
the least, however in the caveat of a 
business context, we can say that a 
philosophically identifiable position of 
knowledge is a phenomenon, which may be 
experienced as a temporal dimension, but 
has to be justified as a true belief before it 
can be termed valuable. Similarly, in this 
case, the construct of our knowledge is 
parallel to doxastic attitude as discussed 
previously. In this discussion, we can 
accept that from a business context, when 
conceiving as a faculty for distinguishing 
between truth and falsity, any experiential 
decision that would lack the cognitive 
status, traditionally ascribed, and therefore 
would be considered a priori false.  
Accordingly, from the standpoint of 
knowledge value, it is important to consider 
the evidence of this knowledge when 
deciding if it is true or not. As such, does 
the knowledge itself need to be better 
understood before it can be successfully 
transferred or is it simply empirical 
cogency, which has been transferred.  
Clearly, from a business context, this 
involves philosophical support by 
paradigms and archetypes overarching 
business activity and relating to business 
success, but thereby giving knowledge 
‘value’ by this premise alone and not as a 
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justification of any other epistemic 
principle.  
 
CONCLUSION   
 
This discussion has focused on outlining 
and assessment of current and historical 
knowledge philosophy, theory and 
positioning, but at the same time, places it 
within the realms of a business context. In 
the discussion, we concentrated on a 
Doxastic attitude and epistemic principle 
surrounding the use of knowledge in a 
business context, wherein, we concluded 
that this combined faced becomes 
necessary when examining if knowledge is 
important. Through reconciliation of 
foundational and doxastic positions, one 
can now view knowledge and knowledge 
value as a singular construct. Importantly 
however, this is characterised through a 
multitude definition but not as a singular 
epistemic principle. Wherein, to assume 
any value or relevance to the sender or 
receiver, the acceptance of the tripartite 
theory of knowledge, Belief, Truth and 
Justification (epistemic principle) must also 
be inferred as a norm within the transfer 
mechanism. Therefore, give justification to 
the premise surrounding the interaction of 
an epistemic knowledge principle, based on 
a knowledge transfer practitioner’s point of 
view supported by a doxastic presumption. 
This would now allow the identification of 
alternative perspectives to knowledge and 
knowledge transfer mechanisms. From the 
perspective of mainstream business 
management literature, and specifically 
relating to underpinning business practices 
of success and competitive advantage, this 
flexibility in interpretation becomes an 
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